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A further indication of Turkmenistan’s intent to dedicate the East-West Pipeline for export to Europe comes from information reported earlier this month by the Indian Express newspaper, that Ashgabad has informed the Technical Working Group on the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline that gas for this project will not come from Dauletabad as previously planned but rather from the South Yolotan-Osman supergiant field that is already also supplying China via a pipeline transiting Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. (For background, see Gas pipeline gigantism, 17 July 2008.)

Despite the planned extension of the Turkmenistan-Iran gas pipeline to Dauletabad on the Turkmenistan side, there is not enough demand by Iran to account for such a switch. The only reasonable conclusion is that Berdimuhamedow sees Dauletabad gas going to Europe through the East-West Pipeline.

Turkmenistan has been exporting gas to northeastern Iran for years, although during the Turkmenbashi era (that is, the presidency of Saparmurat Niyazov, who died in December 2006), sales targets were rarely met for a variety of administrative and industrial reasons. Since Berdimuhamedow came to power, the gas trade has been regularized and apparently put on a more systematic footing, to such a degree that earlier this year a pipeline extension was opened with a view towards increasing gas exports from the current reported level of 8 bcm/y to 20 bcm/y. The existing pipeline, which opened in 1997 runs from Koropeje to Sarakhs.

There has been some misunderstanding of this project even in the specialized international commentary and analysis. It is not a new pipeline that is involved. Rather, the existing pipeline from Koropeje in Turkmenistan to Kordkuy in Iran will have additional compressor stations installed in order to increase its carrying capacity. On the Turkmenistan side, the existing pipeline will be extended to the Dauletabad field to provide for increased quantities, and it will be extended to Khangiran on the Iranian side to provide for increased processing capacity. The construction involved in extending the pipeline Iranian side is projected to take up to two years to execute.

The figure of 20 bcm/y that has more than once appeared in Western commentaries and analyses appears to be based on the supposition that this is a new (parallel) pipeline. It is not; it is an extension of an existing pipeline. In fact, the figure available in the specialized industry press for the capacity of the “new” pipeline is up to 14 bcm/y.

Since actual recent exports through the Korpeje-Kordkuy pipeline are reported in the range of about 6 bcm/y (despite a theoretical maximum capacity of 8 bcm/y), adding that figure to the potential exports of a “new” pipeline, if one existed, could account for the figure of 20 bcm/y. But as this clarification should make clear, that is not the case; moreover, it will take at least two years for the expanded volume to reach planned capacity. In the event, for technical reasons, the total annual export is likely to be closer to 12 bcm/y than 14 bcm/y; and that will take several years to accomplish, assuming the Iran is successful in its intention to extend the pipeline on its own side.

Construction of the East-West Pipeline will contribute to the ongoing unification of Turkmenistan’s gas supply system, which has been under way, generally unremarked, for some time. Yet the consequences are considerable. In particular: with the additional planned construction of a connection between Dauletabad and the new South Yolotan-Osman field, it will become possible for Turkmenistan, merely by opening and closing the proper valves, to switch export quantities and export directions among north (Kazakhstan, Russia), south (Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India), east (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, China), and west (Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, Europe).

[First published in Asia Times Online, 23 September 2010.]